Friday, February 20, 2009
Arendt's Responsibility and Judgment--kick off discussion
Arendt writes, "There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging . . .behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or cold be expected to answer for what he has done" (19). Can you connect this point to past readings (I am thinking in particular of Kaufmann but you may think of other authors) to help us understand Arendt's concept of judgement and then also unpack this idea further with other points that she makes? What is the connection between our ability to judge and the modern liberal notion that we are all moral agents that must cultivate the internal authority to know the difference between right and wrong? How does she elaborate and support this argument?
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I think that Ardent's point of whether or not people can be held accountable for their actions or if they are just a "working cog" is one of great dispute. One of the things that we have talked about in past readings is that something that is unique to humans is our free will but with that will (I believe at least) comes a responsibility to deal with the consequences. Kaufmann makes the point that there are no set morals that are absolute and can be universally applied but I don't think that that means that people can't judge others. If people don't make any kinds of judgment, how can any sense of morality exist? Isn't morality based entirely on how people judge a situation to be? Therefore, they must compare experiences to make these conclusions. Arendt also says that if you don't judge a person as an individual but attribute it to a group and assign blame, "where all are guilty, no one is" (21). This raises the debate over whether or not a person can (or should) separate their morals with the situation even if it means going against the law. This was displayed through the example of Nazi Germany where "They acted under conditions in which every moral act was illegal and every legal act was a crime" (41). So I pose the question, because common moral beliefs change with time, when looking back at a situation is it justifiable to have followed the new sets (even if they may include immoral crimes) or should people be expected to follow some inherent (if there be any) internal morals of their own?
ReplyDeleteLaura definitely poses some interesting questions. I think it is fair to say that without judgment there is no morality, but only to a certain degree. I say this because many times we tend to judge people or situations that have nothing to do with morality. For example, judging someone on how they dress. When we judge those that affect the people around them, such as murderers, is when morality plays a more effective role. This leads to Arendt's claim that, "legal and moral issues are by no means the same, but they have a certain affinity with each other because they both presuppose the power of judgment" (22). She follows this with asking how can we judge without knowing the law or having been in the same situation? (22). Well, it is quite simple and I think we do it all the time. Most of us inherently have the capability to make the distinction between right and wrong. I am not saying though, that we are always in the right place to judge.
ReplyDeleteReferring to Laura's last question, I believe that people should be expected to follow inherent morals of their own, if any, over those set by the change over time, because it is not justifiable to follow new morals that include crime. If everyone did this it could lead to the destruction of humanity. Arendt supports this when talking about someone tempting you to kill your friend or they will and claims, "temptation where one's life is at stake may be a legal excuse for a crime, it certainly is not a moral justification" (18). I think it ultimately comes down to the title of Arendt't book, we must be responsible for our judgments and question ourselves before we do it.
I would like to elaborate on Julia's post regarding mankind's fear of judgement. Arendt continues, "The moment moral issues are raised, even in passing, he who raises them will be confronted with this frightful lack of self-confidence and hence of pride, and also with a kind of mock-modesty that in saying, Who am I to judge?" (19). I think this reluctance to judge is one of the subconscious reasons why religion is appealing to so many people. In monotheistic traditions, God is the one to judge mankind; it's out of one's hands. People can take a passive stance because he is the one with the ultimate authority to judge what is right and what is wrong. On the other hand, religion can be a catalyst for judgment. It gives people a set of moral codes on which to base their judgments. It feels safe judging something this way, because God was the one to set up these rules in the first place, therefore one can't be blamed.
ReplyDeleteIn response to Ana's comment, I vehemently agree that there is an innate knowing of right and wrong that resides within us. It's when we abandon this for a group's set of morals that true catastrophe can result. Arendt explains the judges' position on trying the Nazi war criminal, Eichmann, "For as the judges took great pains to point out explicitly, in a courtroom there is no system on trial, no History or historical trend, no ism, anti-Semitism for instance, but a person, and if the defendant happens to be a functionary, he stands accused precisely because even a functionary is still a human being, and it is in this capacity that he stands trial" (30). This speaks to Laura's ending question. I agree, as did the judges of this trial, that following a new set of morals, if they include sacrificing your humanity, is inexcusable. How could this new set of morals even be named such, when it defies the very meaning of morality?